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Same-Sex Marriage and Taxes
Stephen T. Black
I. INTRODUCTION
―Ann, I‘ve examined your last three years‘ tax returns . . . will you
marry me?‖
―Oh, Andy, I thought you‘d never ask! I‘m so looking forward to the
tax benefits we will enjoy together.‖
―Yes, and when we have children we have even more deductions.
We should marry as soon as possible!‖
Our tax system, while frequently criticized for its complexity, has the
flexibility to encourage or influence behavior. It is used to try to
influence people‘s spending habits to ―jump-start‖ the economy or
encourage businesses to buy more fixed assets.
Tax law may even help to channel marital and family decisions.
Frequently the proponents of same-sex marriage cite the difference in tax
treatment as one of the reasons that same-sex couples receive
discriminatory treatment.1
Marriage can affect a person‘s eligibility for federal benefits such as
Social Security. Married couples may incur higher or lower federal tax
liabilities than they would as single individuals. In all, the General
Accounting Office has counted 1,138 statutory provisions—ranging
from the obvious cases just mentioned to the obscure (landowners‘


Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law Center. J.D. 1994, Brigham Young University; LL.M. 2000,
University of Washington. I thank Professor Lynn Wardle and The Marriage & Family Law
Research Project at the J. Reuben Clark Law School of Brigham Young University for the invitation
to participate in this Symposium. I offer further thanks to Jana Black and Kathy Black for their
invaluable comments on earlier drafts and Tony Palizzi and Steven Pippenger who provided research
assistance. I acknowledge the financial support provided by Franklin Pierce Law Center.
1. E.g., Goodridge v. Mass. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (stating that
the majority of governments around the world, including the United States, have not given
homosexual couples the same rights as traditional relationships in dealing with income and
inheritance tax benefits. This inequality has created a second class status of same-sex relationships.);
HOPE LOZANO-BIELAT & DAVID MASCI, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: REDEFINING MARRIAGE AROUND
THE WORLD (2007), http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=235 (last visited July 11, 2007); NAT‘L ORG.
FOR WOMEN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IS A FEMINIST ISSUE (2004), http://www.now.org/issues
/lgbi/marr-rep.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2008); .
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eligibility to negotiate a surface-mine lease with the Secretary of
Labor)—in which marital status is a factor in determining or receiving
2
―benefits, rights, and privileges.‖

The tax code contains provisions that benefit only married individuals
and families. These benefits provide hundreds to thousands of dollars in
tax relief to individuals, but only if those individuals fall into prescribed
categories.
Part II of this article will explore those categories, and the extent to
which the preference for married couples with children furthers one of
the goals of society, which is to perpetuate itself. The range of benefits
points to an interesting focus: the tax law actively encourages marriage,
and especially marriage between opposite gender individuals who appear
capable of having children. In fact, one of the largest benefits of the tax
system is only available to those couples with children.3
Part III examines the treatment a same-sex couple receives under
current tax law. The effect is discriminatory and real: same-sex couples
are treated as unrelated third parties to each other, and all transactions
between the couple are potentially taxable. When contrasted with the
same transactions between a married couple, the difference can be stark.
Part IV addresses the issue of functionally equivalent families—that
is, non-traditional, family-like arrangements that perform similar
functions to traditional families. This part will explore whether other
types of ―family‖ arrangements should qualify for the same tax benefits
as traditional families. It will analyze the purpose behind the family tax
benefits and whether there is really a functional equivalent to a
traditional family.
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) prevents same-sex couples
from claiming family tax benefits. Part V examines what would happen
if the Act were repealed or found to be unconstitutional. Without the Act,
the federal tax would depend on each state‘s definition of marriage.
There have been previous instances where federal tax consequences were
predicated on state law. The resulting disparity between similarly
situated persons residing in different states required Congressional
action, and it seems likely that the absence of DOMA would require the
same.

2. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE POTENTIAL BUDGETARY IMPACT OF RECOGNIZING SAMESEX MARRIAGES (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5559/06-21SameSexMarriage.pdf (quoting General Accounting Office, Defense of Marriage Act: Update to
Prior Report, GAO-04-353R (Jan. 23, 2004)).
3. The child tax credit is scored at over $42 trillion for 2007. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND
BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 296 (2007) (Tax Expenditures).
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Part VI answers the question, ―Isn‘t this unlawful discrimination?,‖
in the negative. A long history of cases claiming equal protection
violations teaches that the courts are reluctant to second-guess the
legislatures in matters of taxation. In fact, tax discrimination is accorded
rational-basis scrutiny, so that it is only necessary for a tax rule to have
some rational goal to be upheld. Given the purpose of society to
perpetuate itself, it seems that constitutional challenges to the traditional
family bias of the tax code are doomed to fail.
II. THE TAX LAW PREFERS HETEROSEXUAL FAMILIES
A. Tax Benefits
1. Marriage penalties and bonuses
Consider the tale of Ann and Andy, Betty and Bob, and Clyde.4 Ann
and Andy are married; Betty and Bob are not, but live together; Clyde is
a single individual. Ann and Andy make $60,000 and are entitled to a
$10,700 standard deduction and two dependency exemptions of $3,400
each for taxable income of $42,500 ($60,000 - $10,700 - $6,800). Their
tax is $1,565 + .15($42,500 - $15,650) = $5,593 (rounded up). Although
Betty and Bob live together, they are not married, thus each is considered
single. Betty will be entitled to a standard deduction of $5,350 and a
personal exemption of $3,400 for taxable income of $36,250 ($45,000 $5,350 - $3,400). Her tax will be $4,386.25 + .25($36,250 - $31,850) =
$5,486. Notice some of Betty‘s income is taxed at a 25% bracket
whereas Ann and Andy‘s income is taxed at a maximum of 15%. Bob
will also be entitled to a standard deduction of $5,350 and a personal
exemption of $3,400 for taxable income of $6,250 ($15,000 - $5,350 $3,400). His tax will be $625 (all taxed at 10%). Clyde will be entitled to
a standard deduction of $5,350 and a personal exemption of $3,400 for
taxable income of $51,250 ($60,000 - $5,350 - $3,400). His tax will be
$4,386.25 + .25($51,250 - $31,850) = $9,236. Clyde will have $19,400
of his income taxed at 25%. Betty had only $4,400 of her income taxed
at 25% and none of Ann and Andy‘s income was taxed at 25%. These
differences are a function of the ―tax brackets‖ and the filing status
(married or not) of the parties. Their incomes and tax liability are set
forth below:

4. All tax calculations were done using preliminary 2007 tables.
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Taxpayer
Ann
Andy

Income
$0
$60,000

Tax
$0
$5,593

Betty
Bob

$45,000
$15,000

$5,486
+ $ 625
= $6,111

Clyde

$60,000

$9,236
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Ann and Andy pay the lowest amount of tax. This is due, in part, to the
fact that married couples who file jointly are allowed to split their
income for tax purposes. This income splitting allows Ann and Andy to
take advantage of the progressive rate structure of the Code—as a
taxpayer makes more money, the tax rate goes up. Income splitting
―pretends‖ that each party earned one-half of the income. Because each
earns one-half, neither makes enough to get into a higher tax bracket.
The tax rate increase is not continual; rather, the increase is stepped
in brackets. By taking advantage of income splitting, Ann and Andy have
effectively moved some of Andy‘s income from a high tax bracket into
Ann‘s lower (and unused) tax bracket.
This can be readily seen by comparing Betty and Bob‘s tax liability.
While the couple also has $60,000 of income, their tax is slightly higher
by $518 ($6,111 - $5,593). Since Betty and Bob are not married, they
cannot take advantage of income splitting. As a result, Betty‘s income
crosses into the 25% bracket, and the couple‘s combined tax is higher
than if they were married.5 This result is called a marriage bonus. Were
Betty and Bob to get married, they would save $518 on their taxes.
Finally, consider Clyde‘s tax liability. He makes the same amount as
does Andy, or the joint incomes of Betty and Bob, yet Clyde pays the
most tax. If Clyde were to find a willing woman and get married, his
marriage bonus would be $3,643 (assuming that his wife had $0 income).
Now consider two more couples. Dara and Dan are married, but
Emma and Ed are not:

5. If Betty and Bob were each to make $30,000, there would be no bonus—they would pay
the same amount as Ann and Andy.
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Taxpayer

Income

Tax

Dara
Dan

$0
$160,000

$28,893

Emma
Ed

$80,000
$80,000
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$14,236
+ $14,236
= $28,472

If Emma and Ed were to marry, their tax liability would increase. The
$421 difference is called a marriage penalty.
Dara and Dan compute their income as follows: $160,000 – $10,700
(standard deduction) – $6,800 (2 personal exemptions of $3,400 each) =
$142,500. The tax is $24,972 + $3,920 (.28($142,500 – 128,500)). They
have $14,000 taxed at the 28% bracket. Emma and Ed each compute
their income as follows: $80,000 - $5,350 (standard deduction) - $3,400
(personal exemption) = $71,250. The tax for each is $4,386 + $9,850
(.25($71,250 - $31,850)) = $14,236. Since there are two of them, the
combined tax would be $14,236 x 2 = $28,472. Notice they have no
income taxed at the 28% bracket. Thus, Dara and Dan will pay $421
more. This extra money is from the $14,000 that was taxed at 3% more
(28% vs. 25%).
2. Why bonuses or penalties?
The tax code has long been viewed as a vehicle for social change.6 In
1975, Professor Bittker stated, ―[a] persistent problem in the theory of
income taxation is whether natural persons should be taxed as isolated
individuals, or as social beings whose family ties to other taxpayers
affect their taxpaying capacity.‖7 Prior to 1938, the answer was that each
spouse was their own tax individual.
The original income tax laws, however, made no provision for joint
filing, so that husbands and wives completed their own tax returns on
their individual earnings. The story took a markedly different turn with
the escalation of progressive marginal rates during World War I.
6. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax
Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 39 (2006) (―However,
policymakers have also increasingly relied on the tax code rather than direct government
expenditures to subsidize households and influence their behavior as a result of perceived or real
incentives within the tax legislative process . . . .‖).
7. Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1391
(1975).

332

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 22

Because such rates rise with income, it is better to have two persons
each earning $30,000 than one person earning $60,000. Spouses in the
typical unequal-earning marriage first tried to acquire this benefit by
private contractual agreement (e.g., the husband would sign a document
ceding half of his income to his wife), but were thwarted by a Supreme
Court opinion holding that income must be taxed to ―the man who
earned it.‖ But under a later Court ruling in the same year, Poe v.
Seaborn, spouses in community property states were automatically able
8
to get this ―income-splitting‖ benefit.

Taxes usually should play no appreciable part in family planning.9
However, Congress also thought it would be fair to have progressive
rates so that as income increased, so did an individual‘s tax burden.
These two ideas clashed, but if a state had community property laws, its
citizens were better off. Pre-1948 there was no joint filing. This meant
that working wives (during and following WWII) were taxed at the
family‘s marginal rate. Each dollar they earned was added on top of any
other income the family earned, while an unmarried woman‘s earnings
were taxed beginning at the lowest rates.
A remarkable bit of social history followed. Because community
property rules now generated a tax benefit, a flurry of states reformed
their laws, generally by giving wives the minimal rights needed to
satisfy the Supreme Court‘s standards. Congress sought to level the
playing field between community property and other states by
overruling Seaborn. Congress first moved to equalize matters, however,
during World War II, when the revenue needs led to a proposal to tax
all married couples as if they were a single unmarried person. This, of
course, would make it a tax burden to be married anywhere, as long as
both spouses had some personal income, because one spouse‘s income
would simply be added on top of the other‘s, with no offsetting benefit
in the rate structure. This proposal was met by a storm of protests,
labeling the possibility of mandatory joint filing ―un-American‖ and
―antiwomen.‖
Seven years later, in 1948, another proposal was made for
mandatory joint filing, this time at rates set equal to twice what a single
person earning half the total familial income would pay; the community
property regime would be adopted, in essence, for federal tax purposes

8. Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender
Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 989 (1993) (citation omitted).
9. Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 725-27 (2007).
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(i.e., all income was to be split between spouses). This change was
widely praised, and soon after its enactment, the nouveau community
property states all reverted to their former equitable interest laws. States
were willing to change their nontax laws to get tax benefits for
traditional, single-earning families. The quick repeal of these property
laws after 1948 demonstrate that the new-found thinking regarding
10
property rights was tax driven.

The history of joint filing also shows that how society feels about ―the
family‖ can largely influence the tax policy. Over the years, Americans
have had to balance the progressivity of the Code with the impact it has
had on families.
3. Specific benefits
a. Head of household. Congress created the ―head of household‖
category for tax purposes in 1951.11 Most single taxpayers maintaining a
home for the benefit of a dependent are providing benefits to society in
terms of raising children and, therefore, should receive some of the
benefits of tax reduction that married couples obtain through income
splitting.
Essentially, the definition of a ―head of household‖ is an unmarried
individual, including one who is legally separated, who maintains a
household for the entire year for a dependent. Single taxpayers having
no dependents are not in a comparable position. The difference in
income tax rates is not related to customary household expenditure. It
is, rather, recognition of the extra costs incurred in maintaining children
12
or other dependents.

Returning to our couple Ann and Andy, assume that they have had
two children. Compare their tax liability with Francine, a single parent of
two children:

10. Id. at 989–90.
11. Pub. L. No. 183, 82d Cong., 1st Session (1951).
12. U.S. Dep‘t of Treas., FAQs: Filing Statutes for Federal Income
http://www.treas.gov/education/faq/taxes/filing-status.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).

Taxes,

334

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 22

Taxpayer
Ann
Andy

Income
$0
$60,000

Tax

Tax w/o Children

$2,573

$5,593

Betty
Bob

$45,000
$15,000

$1,483
+ $ 625
= $2,108

$6111

$3,733

$9,236

Francine

$60,000

Notice that compared to their liability before having children, Ann and
Andy have to pay $3,020 less. Also note that compared to Clyde (the
single taxpayer), Francine‘s tax is $5,503 lower.13 The calculations are
the same as in the first example, except the family has two additional
dependency exemptions in the amount of $3,400 each, and two $1,000
child tax credits which reduce their tax liability dollar for dollar. Also
note that an assumption was made to give both dependency exemptions
and child tax credits to Betty rather than Bob, since they would not have
been effective if given to Bob. Notice that compared to their liability
before having children, Ann and Andy have to pay $3,020 less ($5,563 $2,000 child tax credits – .15($3,400 x 2) dependency exemptions). Also
note that compared to Clyde (the single taxpayer), Francine‘s tax is
$5,503 lower ($2,000 in child tax credits, $1,904 ($6,800 x .28) for
dependency exemptions, $700 (.28($7,850 - $5,350)) difference between
the standard deduction for a head of household as opposed to a single
person, and $899 due to expanded brackets which tax more income at a
lesser rate).14 The tax law implicitly promotes traditional marriage. While
Francine is much better off for taxation purposes than Clyde, she pays
$1,160 more than do Ann and Andy, who have the same amount of
income. Stated another way, if Francine were to find a willing man (with
$0 income), the U.S. government would subsidize her with $1,160 in
lower taxes every year.15
Consider the case of Betty and Bob. Compared with life before
children, they pay $4,003 less. We made the assumption that Betty got to
claim both children. Notice that Betty‘s tax has dropped from $5,486 to
$1,483 ($2,000 in child tax credits, $1,460 (.25($4,400) + .15($2,400)),

13. Like death, childbearing is not a suggested tool for tax-planning.
14. Like death, childbearing is not a suggested tool for tax-planning.
15. It can be argued that this is simply in recognition of having an extra person in the family.
However, note that the personal exemption for 2007 is $3,400, and the tax savings from that
exemption is only $510. Therefore, the extra $650 is beyond the amount Congress intended to
exempt for extra family members.
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$375 (.15($7,850 - $5,350)) increase in the standard deduction from a
single person to a head of household, and $168 in change of bracket size
reducing the amount of income taxed at a lower rate; thus, all of the
decrease is due to Betty‘s tax change).
This drop in Betty‘s tax will negate the principal reason for the
marriage bonus they would have seen as a childless couple.16 Now that
they have children, the marriage bonus changes to a $465 marriage
penalty. However, this change does not contradict the fact that the tax
law contains a preference for traditional families, as much as it shows
that the law contains a generous bonus for those having children over
those who do not.
Betty and Bob are not similarly situated to Ann and Andy. While the
two couples nominally make the same amount of money, Ann and Andy
are free to transfer their funds between the two of them without tax cost.
When the couple buys a home, there is no imputed gift from one to the
other. When the non-earner spouse takes money from the checking
account to buy food or pay rent, there is no imputed compensation.
Nevertheless, for Betty and Bob, the same is not true.17 If Bob pays
$400 per month to Betty to help defray the grocery bill, for example, the
tax law treats that as a payment between two unrelated persons. What is
the nature of that payment? Was it a gift? Was it compensation for
services? Was it a sale?
Rent paid by Bob to Betty would be includable in her income, and
subject to the rules for renting a home, Betty should have deductions. 18
However, does the arrangement contemplate room and board? If so, is
Bob paying for the provision and storage of food (a service) or for the
food itself (inventory)? Does Betty have $4800 more income, and Bob
no deduction?19 This transaction alone could increase Betty and Bob‘s
combined income to $64,800, and every time the couple shares chores,
cash, or an apartment, the potential income increases.20
As a result, Betty and Bob are really not in the same position as Ann
and Andy. In fact, because of that one transaction alone, Betty and Bob‘s
tax would be as follows:

16. Their marriage bonus (or the fact that they paid higher taxes than a similar married
couple) was due to the fact that they could not engage in income splitting, and Betty‘s income
pushed her into a higher tax bracket. With the advent of children, her income is now taxed in that
lower bracket once again.
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. I.R.C. § 280A (Lexis 2008).
19. Resulting in ―double‖ taxation of the $4800.
20. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (as amended in 2003).
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Betty
Bob

$49,800
$15,000
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$2,203
+ $ 625
= $2,828

Tax Before

– ($2,108)

Increase

= $ 720

Compared with Ann and Andy, they are worse off by $255 (Betty
and Bob‘s new tax of $2,828—Ann and Andy‘s tax of $2,573). This is
due to the marriage ―perk‖ of being treated as a single economic unit,
and not having to compute imputed income due to transfers or exchanges
of services between the couple. This ―perk‖ has been embedded in the
tax law at least since 1928, and demonstrates the strong bias the tax code
has for married couples.21
b. Qualifying child. The filing status changes to the tax rates are not
the only benefits to taxpayers with children. A ―qualifying child‖ may
enable a taxpayer to claim other tax benefits, such as the exemption for a
dependent, the child tax credit, the child and dependent care credit, and
the earned income tax credit. Prior to 2005, each of these items may have
defined ―qualifying child‖ differently, but in 2005, the definition of
qualifying child was consolidated to a single definition.22 To qualify, a
child must satisfy four tests:
• Relationship—the taxpayer‘s child or stepchild (whether by blood
or adoption), foster child, sibling or stepsibling, or a descendant
of one of these.
• Residence—has the same principal residence as the taxpayer for
more than half the tax year. Exceptions apply, in certain cases, for
children of divorced or separated parents, kidnapped children,
temporary absences, and children who were born or died during
the year.
• Age—must be under the age of nineteen at the end of the tax year,
or under the age of twenty-four if a full-time student for at least
five months of the year, or be permanently and totally disabled at
any time during the year.
• Support—did not provide more than one-half of his/her own
support for the year.23
21. When you consider the added effect parent-child exchanges would have, an even stronger
bias towards married couples with children is seen.
22. I.R.C. § 152 (Lexis 2008).
23. Id. § 152(c).
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For federal tax purposes, only the birth or adoptive parent(s) and
their spouses will be able to have a ―qualifying child.‖ This means that
for purposes of
• head of household status,24
• the exemption for a dependent,25
• the child tax credit,26
• the child and dependent care credit,27
• the earned income tax credit,28
• the HOPE and lifetime learning credits,29 and
• the credit for adoption expenses,30
only those with children may claim these benefits.
c. Transfers. As mentioned earlier, a married couple, in addition to
being able to income split, may also exclude all transfers within the
marriage unit.31 With non-spouses, the tax code treats transfers between
individuals as compensation, gifts, loans, etc. In other words, for a
married couple, intraspousal transfers are non-tax events.32 For any other
couple, transfers are viewed as if the parties are strangers to each other.33
d. Estate and gift tax benefits. A married couple also enjoys several
estate and gift tax benefits, including the spousal gift deduction and gift
splitting.34 These mechanisms allow spouses to act as one taxpayer with
double the benefits. The spousal gift deduction under I.R.C. § 2523
allows spouses to transfer an unlimited amount of property or cash to one
another without recognizing a tax. Same-sex couples cannot take
advantage of this statute, and therefore all their intra-relationship
transfers may be subject to gift tax.
Gift splitting under I.R.C. § 2513 gives married couples the
advantage of allowing them to split any gift given by one spouse as if it
was given by both. Therefore if Andy gave a $19,000 gift to a friend,
then he would be able to split the gift, utilizing both Andy‘s and Ann‘s
24. Id. § 2(b).
25. Id. § 152(a).
26. Id. § 24(c).
27. Id. § 21(b).
28. Id. § 32(c).
29. Id. § 25A(f).
30. Id. § 32.
31. Id. § 1041.
32. This is true even in divorce. See, e.g., Katherine D. Podris & Gary J. Podris, Internal
Revenue Code Section 1041 Is Not a Model of Tax Reform Legislation, TAXES—THE TAX
MAGAZINE, June 1991.
33. See infra Part III.B.
34. I.R.C. § 2523 (Lexis 2008).
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annual exclusion of $12,000, so he could exclude the entire $19,000 gift.
If Andy was not married then he would only be able to exclude $12,000
and $7,000 would be subject to a gift tax. This would be the case in
relationships that are not viewed as marriage by the federal government.
B. Policy Behind the Tax Benefits
The presence of a marriage penalty or a marriage bonus has troubled
tax scholars for decades. The problem lies in balancing three competing
goals. As Professor Bittker has written, ―[i]n short, we cannot
simultaneously have (a) progression, (b) equal taxes on equal-income
married couples, and (c) a marriage-neutral tax burden.‖35 If we have a
marriage-neutral system, then a couple would pay the same tax whether
they were married or not. That would favor the two-earner couple but
harm the single-earner couple, since for the same amount of income, the
two-earner couple has spread that income over two individuals‘ brackets.
Favoring equality we dismiss neutrality, since we treat the married
couple as a unit; we must then accept marriage penalties or bonuses. We
could have both equality and neutrality, but we would have to toss our
progressive rate scheme out the window.
Tax scholars straddling other fields have made numerous suggestions
about how best to balance these goals. Some scholars have proposed
doing away with joint filing,36 while others have suggested that perhaps
it is not the married couple, but rather an ―economic unit‖ that should
have income splitting.37
In view of these suggestions, or maybe despite them, it may well be
that we have gotten ahead of ourselves. Having an ideal tax system, or
even a tax system that addresses similarly situated taxpayers in an equal
manner, is a worthy goal. However, having the tax system drive, or
perhaps even motivate, social behavior may be beyond its ability. As
Professor Alstott has said, speaking with regard to feminist tax
advocates:
Despite proponents‘ claims, it is extremely difficult to use tax law rules
to change the division of family labor within the household, to improve
women‘s economic well-being, or to increase women‘s financial power
35. Bittker, supra note 7.
36. See, e.g., Pamela Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax
Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1980); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family,
Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63 (1993); McCaffery, supra
note 8; Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV 339 (1994).
37. Shari Motro, A New I Do: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV.
1509 (2006).
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within the family. This constraint is not unique to tax law, but instead
reflects the limited capacity of legal rules governing financial
entitlements to change deeply entrenched social norms about gender
38
roles.

If the tax law does not drive societal norms, then what is the purpose?
Instinct in each of these first three functions of family law [protection,
organization, and facilitation] lies a relatively commonplace idea:
There are people (particularly children) the law is widely expected to
protect, contracts it is widely expected to facilitate, and disputes it is
widely expected to arbitrate. However, the last two functions of family
law are less self-evident and more controversial. The first of these is the
expressive function. . . .
Finally, in the channelling function the law creates or (more often)
supports social institutions which are thought to serve desirable
ends. . . . Generally, the channelling function does not specifically
require people to use these social institutions, although it may offer
incentives and disincentives for their use. Primarily, rather, it is their
very presence, the social currency they have, and the governmental
support they receive which combine to make it seem reasonable and
even natural for people to use them. Thus people can be said to be
39
channelled into them.

We can look at the current filing status regime with this lens: Since 1938
we have had joint liability for spouses, and since 1948 we have had joint
filing. Whatever the current mix of marriage penalties and bonuses, the
tax law has mirrored society‘s preference for marriage, and not for just
any marriage.
Since there is generally a marriage penalty for two-earner couples
(which is most pronounced when both spouses earn about the same
amount), we can say that current law favors the single-earner couple.
Coupled with the other provisions of the code dealing with families and
children,40 we see that the favored status is that of a single-earner couple
with children.

38. Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2005 (1996).
39. Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495,
497–98 (1992).
40. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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1. Who benefits?
Marriage is a particular arrangement belonging to three parties—the
husband, the wife, and the state.41 Society agrees to view the marriage as
one legal entity created by a three-way contract involving the wife,
husband, and society. The tax code still takes that approach today with
joint filing of married couples. Blackstone did not ascribe this as a
natural state of affairs, but rather a creation of society for the benefit of
society.42 ―Establishment of marriage in all civilized states is built on this
natural obligation of the father to provide for his children; for that
ascertains and makes known the person who is bound to fulfill this
obligation.‖43
Blackstone tells us that the reason for creating a single-family unit in
the eyes of society is to provide for children. In fact, one key goal of
society is to provide for having children.44
First, the Legislature could rationally decide that, for the welfare of
children, it is more important to promote stability, and to avoid
instability, in opposite-sex than in same-sex relationships. Heterosexual
intercourse has a natural tendency to lead to the birth of children;
homosexual intercourse does not. Despite the advances of science, it
remains true that the vast majority of children are born as a result of a
sexual relationship between a man and a woman, and the Legislature
could find that this will continue to be true. The Legislature could also
find that such relationships are all too often casual or temporary. It
could find that an important function of marriage is to create more
stability and permanence in the relationships that cause children to be
born. It thus could choose to offer an inducement—in the form of
marriage and its attendant benefits—to opposite-sex couples who make
45
a solemn, long-term commitment to each other.

41. In re Lindgren, 43 N.Y.S.2d 154, 170 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (―There are three parties to every
marriage contract—the two spouses and the state.‖), aff’d, 46 N.Y.S.2d 224 (App. Div. 1943), aff’d,
55 N.E.2d 849 (N.Y. 1944); Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 114 (W. Va. 1985) (―[T]he state is a third
party to any marriage contract.‖).
42. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *447.
43. Id.
44. See Jonathan Head, Japan Sounds Alarm on Birth Rate, B.B.C. NEWS, Dec. 3, 2004,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4065647.stm (―The decline in Japan‘s birth rate
is so severe they have invented a word for it—‗shoshika,‘ meaning a society without children.
Unless women here start having more babies, the population in Japan is expected to shrink more
than 20% by the middle of this century. Nearly half would be elderly, placing impossible burdens on
the health and pension systems.‖).
45. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 359 (N.Y. 2006).
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Our tax code assists the married unit by giving benefits, such as tax
credits, to a family unit. The tax benefit given is because of the child and
the purpose of this benefit is to directly help the child.46
2. Conclusion
There may be a marriage bonus, as seen above by comparing the tax
liability of Ann and Andy with that of Clyde. That marriage bonus is
greater if one spouse does not work.47 The rationale behind this: the tax
law gives the greatest benefit to those marriages best designed to be
traditional families. In fact, we could sum up this channeling purpose as
follows: the marriage benefits belong to families with children.
III. TAXATION OF SAME-SEX COUPLES
Unlike traditional married couples, same-sex couples have no
inherent tax advantages. Instead, they face a number of disadvantages
natural to any unmarried couple living together, and a number of hidden
problems brought on by recent changes in state law.
A. DOMA
In 1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act, which
provides:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word ―marriage‖ means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word ―spouse‖ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
48
husband or a wife.

Its stated purpose reflects congressional concern that legalizing same-sex
―marriage‖ would lead to problems with interstate relations, federal laws,
46. See Leah Ward Sears, The “Marriage Gap”: A Case for Strengthening Marriage in the
21st Century, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1243, 1244 (2007) (―Thus, we should explore how the law can
preserve and expand the protections and benefits marriage promises to our children and
communities.‖).
47. That is not to say that the law subsidizes the stay at home parent. Should Betty (the
spouse in the second case) quit her job, the couple would find itself $30,000 less rich. However, the
tax law would then equate Betty and Bob with couples that make $30,000 a year, and compared to
them, Betty and Bob get a large marriage bonus.
48. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 1105, 100 Stat. 2419 (1996).
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the institution of marriage, traditional notions of morality, and state
sovereignty.49 Although DOMA produced a body of law reviews on its
own,50 it has not been successfully challenged in court.51 DOMA
effectively ends the argument about same-sex marriage with respect to
federal law and federal tax benefits.
B. Income Tax
If, for federal tax purposes, a same-sex couple is not married, then
what is their status? Generally speaking, the ―couple‖ is two single
taxpayers. No election to file jointly is available. No income splitting is
available.
The impact of this limitation can be illustrated with a simple
example. Stacey and Tina live together. While each maintains her own
checking account and pays her own bills, Stacey is a chef-in-training and
Tina runs a landscape design business; therefore, they agree that Stacey
will do the cooking and Tina will care for the yard. How does the tax law
view this arrangement?
If a married couple that elected to file jointly were to engage in the
same transaction, the law would not care about the tax consequences.
This, strangely enough, has less to do with tax law than it does reliance
upon the legal autonomy of family relations. The earliest examples of
this involve two cases heard by the Board of Tax Appeals. In Burkhart v.
Commissioner, the husband attempted to pay his wife for her duties as a
housewife.52 In Appeal of Robinson, the wife attempted to pay her
husband for giving up his seafaring life.53 In both cases, the court ignored
the payments. In both cases, the court assumed that there could be no
income realized by the transferee, and the Robinson court made this
conclusion about the attempted transfer:
It is also argued that, in case the entire amount of the trust income is
determined to be income to the taxpayer [wife], the part thereof going
49. H.R. Rep. No. 104-664 at 1–18 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905–23.
50. See, e.g., LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1247 n.49 (3d ed.
2000); Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is
Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1997); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws,
and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997); see also Mark
Strasser, Marriage, Transsexuals, and the Meaning of Sex: on DOMA, Full Faith and Credit, and
Statutory Interpretation, 3 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL‘Y 301 (2003).
51. See Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006); Wilson v. Ake, 2004 WL
3142528 (M.D. Fla. 2004); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004); Bishop v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (N.D. Okla. 2006).
52. Burkhart v. Comm‘r, 11 B.T.A. 275 (1928).
53. Appeal of Robinson, 4 B.T.A. 504 (1926).
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to the husband was under the contract a business expense to the
taxpayer. We think it plain enough without discussion that this
agreement between them was purely a family arrangement arising out
of the marital relation, and that it was not entered into by the taxpayer
54
for pecuniary profit.

While this comment was directed at the attempted deduction, it has been
assumed that intramarital services do not produce income.
At least one commentator has suggested that the same rationale
might not apply to same-sex couples.55 That is certainly a reasonable
inference, although not strictly statutory, since the exclusion for imputed
domestic income is not statutory, but instead has a rather sketchy
history.56 What this means generally is that same-sex couples may have
imputed income from each non-gift transfer of property and from every
exchange of services.
C. Transfers
Transfers between unmarried persons can also lead to both gift and
estate tax problems.
Under current tax rules, the creation of a joint tenancy usually
constitutes a taxable gift if the tenants‘ contributions to the purchase or
improvement of the property are unequal. For example, if Anna makes
a $30,000 down payment to enable Anna and Beth to purchase a home
as joint tenants, Anna will be viewed as making a $15,000 gift to
Beth. . . . The creation of the joint tenancy is viewed as a completed gift
of half the value of the property because, in most cases, the donee
tenant can sever the joint tenancy unilaterally. The severance would
convert the joint tenancy into a tenancy in common, whereby Beth
would own an undivided one-half interest in the property. The IRS
maintains the position, as reflected in the Treasury Regulations, that

54. Id. at 506.
55. Patricia Cain, Taxing Women: Thoughts on a Gendered Economy, Symposium: The
Income Tax: Taxing Lesbians, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN‘S STUD. 471, 477–78 (1997); Shari
Motro, supra note 37, at 1537–38.
56. Smith v. C.I.R., 40 B.T.A. 1038, 1039 (1939) (―There results no taxable income from the
performance of [a wife‘s] service and the correlative expenditure is personal and not susceptible of
deduction.‖); Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive
and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1608 (1977) (noting that benefits from
household services and home ownership are tax free); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO.
L.J. 1571, 1577–78 (1996). But cf. Bruce Wolk, Federal Tax Consequences of Wealth Transfers
Between Unmarried Cohabitants, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1240, 1248–49 (1980) (stating that cohabitants
must pay tax on exchanged services).
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because Beth has the unilateral power to vest half the property in
herself, Beth must be viewed as owning half the property outright from
the time the joint tenancy was created.
While creation of the joint tenancy is considered a completed
transfer for gift tax purposes, it is not viewed as a completed transfer
for estate tax purposes. Under section 2040 of the Code, if the home is
still owned by Anna and Beth as joint tenants at Anna‘s death, the
transfer will be viewed as though it occurred at the death of Anna rather
than at the time of the inter vivos transfer. The specific rule of section
2040 establishes a rebuttable presumption that the first joint tenant to
die contributed 100% of the purchase price to acquire the property.
Unless the presumption is rebutted, 100% of the value of the property
57
will be included in Anna‘s estate at her death.

That same transaction, where one spouse alone pays the $30,000
down payment on property to be held in joint tenancy, has no gift or
estate tax consequences for married couples.58
D. Estate and Gift Tax
Same-sex couples enjoy no benefits under the estate and gift tax.
They do not get the benefit of the spousal gift deduction. This means that
under current law, each gift in excess of $11,000 is taxable as a gift to
the donor, and is counted against the donor‘s applicable exclusion
amount. When the donor‘s applicable exclusion amount is used up, the
gift and estate tax will kick in.
E. Number of Tax Returns Filed
Quiz #1: Same-sex couples who both have income and who married
in Massachusetts will prepare how many tax returns this April?59
a. 0
b. 2
c. 3
d. 4
e. 5

57. Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal Revenue Code, 34 U.S.F. L.
REV. 465, 476-78 (2000).
58. I.R.C. §§ 2040, 2523 (Lexis 2008).
59. Example taken from Eva Rosenberg, Giant Tax Headaches for Gay Couples,
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Taxes/PreparationTips/GiantTaxHeadachesForGayCouples.asp
x?page=all (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
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Since May 16, 2004, Massachusetts law has permitted same-sex
couples to marry.60 Massachusetts same-sex couples must file state taxes
as married (joint or separate).61 However, for federal tax purposes, the
couple is not married. For federal purposes, each spouse must file as a
single individual. That is three returns so far.
Massachusetts law does not have its own definition of income:
―Massachusetts gross income shall mean the federal gross
income . . . .‖62 Therefore, to arrive at Massachusetts gross (joint)
income, the couple would need federal gross (joint) income.
The correct answer is ―d.‖ The couple would prepare two federal
returns (to be filed), a dummy federal joint return (to get the numbers for
the Massachusetts return), and a Massachusetts joint return.
Quiz #2: Assume the federal government repeals DOMA and
changes its definition of marriage. If that same couple were to move to
Utah, how many returns would they need?
a. 0
b. 2
c. 3
d. 4
e. 5
The correct answer is now ―e.‖ The couple would be able to file a joint
return for federal purposes, but Utah prohibits same-sex marriages.63
Since Utah, like Massachusetts, has no independent state definition of
income,64 two dummy federal returns would have to be prepared from
which to pull the state numbers and then two actual state returns would
have to be filed. That makes five total returns. The complexity has only
begun.
What if a couple moves from a state which allows same-sex
unions to a state which does not? What if they have income from
multiple states and need to file in each of those states? The following
chart shows states that recognize same-sex unions or marriages:

60. Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
61. Mass. Dept. of Revenue, TIR 04-17: Massachusetts Tax Issues Associated with SameSex Marriages, http://www.mass.gov (search for ―TIR 04-17 and follow link) (last visited Apr. 29,
2008).
62. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 62, § 2(a) (West 2008).
63. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29.
64. UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-103(1)(y) (2007).
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State

Effective date

CA

Jan. 1, 2007

CT

April 20, 2005

DC

June 24, 1995

HI

July 8, 1997

ME

July 30, 2004

MA

May 16, 2004

NJ

Type of
union
Domestic
partner

Joint
tax
return
Yes

[Volume 22

Highest tax rate;
income level at
which it applies
9.3%; greater than
$43,467
5%; greater than
$10,000
9%; greater than
$30,000
8.25%; greater than
$40,000
8.5%; greater than
$18,250

Civil unions
Domestic
partner
Reciprocal
beneficiary
Domestic
partner

Yes

Yes

Feb. 19, 2007

Marriage
Civil unions
/RDP

VT

Dec. 20, 1999

Civil unions

Yes

5.3%; flat rate
8.97%; greater than
$500,000
9.5%; greater than
$336,500

NH

Jan. 1, 2008

Civil unions

No?

No state income tax

Yes
No
Yes

Yes

It is not clear how couples in these states will file. For one example
of the complexity, Connecticut‘s civil union law initially specified that
parties to a civil union would be able to file jointly,65 but Connecticut‘s
income tax statute based the tax on the federal filing status.66 Connecticut
rectified this oversight with the passage of Public Act 05-03, § 58 (July
2005).
In each state which uses some form of the federal income as a base,
it is common for adjustments to be made. If the federal and state tax
systems are not aligned (as will happen when a couple is married for
state purposes, but not for federal purposes), those adjustments can cause
confusion as well.67 A continued push for same-sex recognition will only
mean more confusion when dealing with the tax laws. For some couples,
it will in fact mean increased costs, both direct (in terms of more tax
liability) and indirect (for example, more returns needing to be
prepared).68

65. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38pp (2007).
66. Id. § 12-700 (2007).
67. To name just a few areas of confusion: Will capital gains and losses for the couple be
treated individually or netted? Will the couple be able to combine the exclusion for the gains from a
principal residence? Which adjusted gross income figure will they use?
68. Moreover, you can forget using TurboTax. The popular tax software doesn‘t even touch
this.
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IV. FUNCTIONALLY EQUIVALENT FAMILIES
Section II.B noted that benefits were given to couples who had
children, and that those benefits were to assist the family in raising
children. If a non-traditional family-like unit, which is not a nuclear
family consisting of father, mother, and children, performs the same
functions of child rearing, shouldn‘t they get the same benefits under the
tax code?
The argument is appealing.69 There is a certain horizontal equity-ness
to it, until you realize that what we are trying to compute is an income
tax. That means that all income is includable, but only those deductions
specifically given by Congress are deductible. So, generally speaking,
only deductions that specifically relate to the production of income
(business deductions, certain types of losses, deductions attributable to
the production of income, etc.) are allowed.
However, Congress has allowed for other types of deductions as
well. These generally fit into two categories. They are either (1) totally
capricious, have nothing to do with a rational computation of income tax
and exist only because there was a lobbyist pushing for them, or (2)
deductions offered for some non-governmental benefit to society, in a
quid pro quo manner. True, there are a number of the former, but far
more of the latter.
Examples of deductions that are quid pro quo beneficial would
include the deduction for charitable donations, the medical expense
deduction, and the deduction for retirement contributions. None of these
are necessary for the computation of an income tax. Each, however,
serves to benefit society in a way that seems advisable to Congress. The
charitable donations advance work that might be more efficiently done
by organizations other than government.70 Medical expense deductions
recognize that a taxpayer with truly extraordinary medical costs does not
have the same ability to pay that other taxpayers do.71 Retirement
contribution deductions encourage taxpayers to save, which in turn
supports the economy.72
69. See, e.g., Linda Newstrom, Note, The Horizon of Rights: Lessons from South Africa for
the Post-Goodridge Analysis of Same-sex Marriage, 40 CORNELL INT‘L L.J. 781, 791 (2007).
70. Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV.
1393, 1399 n.19 and accompanying text (1988).
71. Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS
L.J. 343 (1989); William Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV.
309 (1972).
72. ―Granting a deduction to employers and employees when they contribute to a retirement
account for the employee‘s benefit is consistent with the national policy of providing for the care and
support for the elderly without draining the resources of the working market economy.‖ Darryll K.
Jones, The Neglected Role of International Altruistic Investment in the Chinese Transition Economy,
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Deductions relating to the family and children also fall into this
category of societally bargained-for deductions. Moreover, what is the
quid pro quo for these deductions? The Supreme Court in Skinner v.
Oklahoma said, ―Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race.‖73 A society without children will
soon die out. It therefore is a legitimate, if not vital, goal of society to
encourage its own perpetuation through marriage and childbearing.74
The justification for marital and child rearing tax benefits really
mean nothing if there are no children involved. However, how do we
know which marriages will produce children? What proof is required?
How do we know that a non-nuclear family is performing an equivalent
service to society?
We do not require proof of intimacy to extend marriage benefits. We
do require a child to be present for the additional child-rearing benefits to
apply, but we certainly do not have a child rearing test (bring in your
dirty diapers to get a credit!). So why not extend tax benefits to every
couple? We allow elderly and infertile couples to marry and obtain tax
benefits. Why not same-sex couples?
The answer is found in the only question that could be asked in a tax
system. For charitable donations, proof of the donation is required. The
same is true for medical expenses and retirement savings. In fact, it is
true for many of the child deductions as well: payment of the necessary
expenses on behalf of a qualifying child will allow the deduction.
However, the greatest number of benefits—the full range of tax
dispensation—is reserved for those who can (1) produce and (2) rear a
child or children. How do you substantiate that?
It is the combination of these two roles for which society offers the
marital tax benefits. Furthermore, in deference to personal privacy,
society cannot ask a couple what efforts they are expending to fulfill the
bargain. So instead, Congress adopts a bright line test: those couples who
fit into the class of persons who could provide both roles get the benefits.
It is that simple. Is it exact? No.75 The test is both over-inclusive and
36 GEO. WASH. INT‘L L. REV. 71, 92 (2004).
73. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
74. See Steven Ozment, Diminishing Europe: The Good Life in Germany Does Not Include
Children, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Oct. 8, 2007, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com
/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/168gqjij.asp?pg=1 (―A society without children is a society
without a future.‖).
75. See Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 868 (8th Cir. 2006) (―But under
rational-basis review, ‗Even if the classification . . . is to some extent both underinclusive and
overinclusive, and hence the line drawn . . . imperfect, it is nevertheless the rule that . . . perfection is
by no means required.‘ Legislatures are permitted to use generalizations so long as ‗the question is at
least debatable.‘ The package of government benefits and restrictions that accompany the institution
of formal marriage serve a variety of other purposes. The legislature-or the people through the
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discriminatory. It is over-inclusive in that some opposite-gender married
couples will never have children, but yet will qualify for some of the tax
benefits. It is discriminatory because some family arrangements that care
for and raise children do not qualify for all the tax benefits, although they
are given some of the benefits aimed at helping the children. Then again,
what other test could there be, that would not throw wide open the door
of possibility of tax gamesmanship?
V. IS DOMA SEPARABLE FROM THE TAX CODE?
Policy reasons aside, the practical reason that tax benefits do not
flow to same-sex couples currently is that DOMA removes the definition
of marriage from state control. If DOMA were to be repealed or held
unconstitutional, would tax benefits be available to same-sex married
couples?
The answer to that question is complex. Under our constitutional
system, we would prefer to have state family law control the definition of
a marriage. However, we have to compute a federal income tax, and we
have two precedents in this regard where states, in their exercise of their
sovereignty, have created confusion in the tax system.
A. Joint Filing
The first precedent that has created tax problems is found in the
history of joint filing. In the early part of the twentieth century, a
relatively new income tax system was trying to come to grips with fairly
taxing the nation. Complicating matters was the fact that some states
used a common law property system, where each spouse‘s earnings
belonged to them, while other states employed a community property
system, which treated marital earnings as shared. A bill requiring
mandatory joint filing was floated for a few years, but ultimately died in
1941. In the meantime, two states, Oklahoma and Oregon, attempted to
secure for their citizens the advantages of community property income
sharing by enacting elective community property systems in 1939 and
1943, respectively.
The Supreme Court, however, struck down these attempts in
Commissioner v. Harmon,76 reasoning that since the community property
initiative process-may rationally choose not to expand in wholesale fashion the groups entitled to
those benefits. ‗We accept such imperfection because it is in turn rationally related to the secondary
objective of legislative convenience.‘‖) (citations omitted).
76. Comm‘r. v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944).
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arrangement was elective, it was no more effective than the assignment
of income, which the Court invalidated in Lucas v. Earl.77 Oklahoma and
Oregon got the message, and made their community property systems
mandatory. The IRS approved these two states as having valid
community property systems, and soon Hawaii, Nebraska, Michigan, and
Pennsylvania changed their property systems as well. Other states,
including Massachusetts and New York, apparently feeling left out,
began to consider a change to community property.
In 1948, faced with a growing tax disparity between married couples
in different states, Congress faced a choice. It could revisit the
mandatory joint filing proposal, but would now face more states
committed to defeating it. It could legislate that income would be taxed
to the earner, despite the state classification of community property (also
politically unpopular). It could do nothing, which in effect would result
in a nationwide adoption of community property laws.
Instead, Congress passed an elective joint filing bill. This had the
double benefit of not being a direct attack on state sovereignty, but at the
same time, stole all the thunder from a state contemplating a change in its
property laws for tax benefits alone. Soon after, many of the new
community property states reverted to their old property laws.78
B. Limited Liability Companies
The second example of a bad precedent for tax law occurred in the
70s and 80s with the advent of limited liability companies (LLCs).
Wyoming started this by asking the question—not unlike the question of
legalizing same-sex marriage—what happens if we change the definition
of a corporation? You see, we inherited corporations from the British,
who may have stolen the idea from some other source.79 The corporate
form was seen as rigid, but granted limited liability to the owners.
Partnerships, on the other hand, were seen as flexible but lacking liability
protection.
In 1977, Wyoming became the first American state to enact a true
LLC, which combined corporate limited liability with partnership
attributes. The problem was again uniformity among the states, this time
in terms of tax classification.
77. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
78. Susan Kalinka, Federal Taxation of Community Income: A Simpler and More Equitable
Approach, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 633, 634 n.3; Calvin G. C. Pang, Slow Baked, Flash-Fried, Not to Be
Devoured: Development of the Partnership Model of Property Division in Hawai’i and Beyond, 20
U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 27 n.105 (1998).
79. New Internationalist, A Short History of Corporations, July 2002,
http://www.newint.org/features/2002/07/01/history-of-corporations/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
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Prior to Wyoming‘s experiment, federal taxation of business
enterprises was primarily grouped into two categories: corporations and
partnerships. Deciding into which category a business would fall
involved a multi-factor test.80 In the years following 1977, many other
states started to experiment with adjusting the line between corporations
and partnerships, until the various differences in state business entities
made interstate business planning a nightmare. It was next to impossible
to tell whether an LLC formed in one state would in fact be treated as a
partnership (as was usually the goal) for federal purposes, and how that
entity would be treated in the other states where it did business.
As the complexity started by the LLC experiment grew, so did the
cost of doing business because tax attorneys had to be consulted for
opinion letters with each new business formation.81 To fix this, the U.S.
Treasury issued proposed check-the-box regulations on May 9, 1996.82
These regulations provided a series of yes/no questions, which, when
answered, would provide a clear classification of the type of business
entity. The check-the-box regulations, like the elective joint return in
1948, ended the need for states to experiment, since it provided for easier
qualification of non-corporate entities.
C. A Post-DOMA Tax Code
In a post-DOMA world, states would be free to fashion their own
definition of marriage, to which federal tax benefits would attach. Like
the examples of community property in the 1940s and the LLC in the
1980s, it is likely that a serious disparity between the states would soon
develop. In fact, it would be probable that at least one state would
attempt to define marriage in such a way that non-cohabiting, non-family
pairs83 of any description could elect ―marriage‖ simply to gain tax
benefits.
In such a world, Congress would again have to act to restore
rationality. The choices facing Congress would be (1) do nothing, and
allow all states to define marriage as broadly as they will, (2) define

80. See Morrissey v. Comm‘r., 296 U.S. 344 (1935); United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418,
421–24 (9th Cir. 1954).
81. New York State Bar Association Tax Section, NYSBA Tax Section Strongly Endorses
Check-The-Box Entity Classification Proposal, 95 Tax Notes Int‘l (TA) 172-13 (Sept. 6, 1995)
(―[T]he ‗check-the-box‘ system would dramatically reduce interpretative and compliance burdens
for taxpayers and the government without changing the classification outcome in very many cases.
The Committee has therefore concluded that the Treasury does have the authority to issue
regulations implementing the ‗check-the-box‘ system for domestic unincorporated entities.‖).
82. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701, 61 Fed. Reg. 21990 (May 13, 1996).
83. Or groups—why would the number of spouses need to be limited to two?
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marriage for federal purposes in a way to withstand Fifth Amendment
scrutiny,84 or (3) define marriage broadly itself.
There are two arguments suggesting that Congress would choose the
second option. The first is that either of the two other options entails a
great deal of work. There are dozens if not hundreds of tax provisions
implicated by the definition of marriage. Congress would either have to
repeal all benefits for marriage or engage in a major ―marriage overhaul‖
of the tax code. Failure to do so would mean inconsistency and years of
uncertainty litigating marriage benefit issues.
The second argument is similar. A change in the tax definition of
marriage would invite the questions ―Who qualifies and why?‖ The
current tax benefits are tied to a societal goal. Expanding the class that
gets those benefits begs the question of whether the benefits still advance
the goal. That in turn, could lead to the suggestion that tax benefits for
marriage and children be removed from the code altogether.
While stranger results have occurred, it seems that faced with a postDOMA tax code, Congress would act to replace the definition of
marriage, for tax purposes, as between a couple capable of both
producing and rearing children.
VI. TAX LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Is the definition of marriage as between a man and a woman for tax
purposes, with or without DOMA, a violation of equal protection? The
answer is found in the curious jurisprudence surrounding taxation.
A. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
In Dane v. Johnson, in response to the suit by a citizen of
Massachusetts, the Supreme Court said:
[I]t may plainly be derived from the cases cited that since the system of
taxation has not yet been devised which will return precisely the same
measure of benefit to each taxpayer or class of taxpayers, in proportion
to payment made, as will be returned to every other individual or class
paying a given tax, it is not within either the disposition or power of
this court to revise the necessarily complicated taxing systems of the
states for the purpose of attempting to produce what might be thought
to be a more just distribution of the burdens of taxation than that
arrived at by the state Legislatures; and that where, as here, conflict

84. That is, in a manner rationally related to the purpose of the deduction.

327]

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND TAXES

353

with federal power is not involved, a state tax law will be held to
conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment only where it proposes, or
clearly results in, such flagrant and palpable inequality between the
burden imposed and the benefit received, as to amount to the arbitrary
taking of property without compensation—‗to spoliation under the
guise of exerting the power of taxing.‘

Then, quoting Chief Justice Marshall, the Court continued:
‗This vital power [of taxation] may be abused, but the Constitution
of the United States was not intended to furnish the corrective for every
abuse of power which may be committed by the state governments. The
interest, wisdom, and justice of the representative body, and its
relations with its constituents, furnish the only security, where there is
no express contract, against unjust and excessive taxation; as well as
85
against unwise legislation generally.‘

―It appears that Equal Protection does not generally apply to economic
disparities.‖86 True, a tax that discriminates based on some suspect
classification should be subject to equal protection claims.87
[H]owever, the Internal Revenue Code clearly affects some apparently
equally-situated taxpayers differently. While two taxpayers may have
the same income, the Code treats differently the taxpayer who is
chronically ill and incurs medical expenses, the taxpayer who suffers a
substantial casualty loss, and the taxpayer whose income is derived
from investments rather than labor. Those who recoup damages for
non-physical injuries are treated differently from those who suffer
physical injuries. Married women are treated differently than unmarried
women by having their income taxed at a higher marginal rate owing to
their husband‘s relatively high income. Such disparities seem not to
88
have troubled the Court.

For example, in Kahn v. Shevin, Florida provided a $500 tax exemption
to widows, but not to widowers. The state‘s purpose in doing so was the
85. Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589, 598–99 (1921) (citation omitted).
86. Leo P. Martinez, The Trouble with Taxes: Fairness, Tax Policy, and the Constitution, 31
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413, 434 (2004).
87. But see Mfr‘s Hanover Trust Co. v. United States, 775 F.2d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1985)
(―Although the challenged IRS practice did distinguish between males and females, the gender
classification was substantially related to the important governmental objective of promoting equity
and fairness in estate taxes by accurately valuing reversionary interests.‖).
88. Martinez, supra note 86, at 434–35.
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reduction of ―the disparity between the economic capabilities of a man
and a woman.‖ Upholding the state statute, the Supreme Court said,
―[w]here taxation is concerned and no specific federal right, apart from
equal protection, is imperiled, the States have large leeway in making
classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment produce
reasonable systems of taxation.‖89
In 1940, the Supreme Court said, ―in taxation, even more than in
other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification.‖90
This sentiment actually dates back to the year the Sixteenth Amendment
was ratified: ―The power of exemption would seem to imply the power
of discrimination, and in taxation, as in other matters of legislation,
classification is within the competency of the legislature.‖91
Tax legislation, then, quite plainly is unique. The extreme
reluctance to second-guess the taxing authorities reveals the Court‘s
implicit support for the proposition that taxes play a vital role in the
existence and functioning of the government. . . .
Notwithstanding the notion that fairness or equity limits the power
to tax, the deference to legislative power is thematic, and carries
through the Court‘s opinions on all tax matters. What we are left with,
whether satisfactory or not, is that ‗the Constitution grants legislators,
not courts, broad authority (within the bounds of rationality) to decide
whom they wish to help with their tax laws and how much help those
laws ought to provide.‘ Accordingly, ―[t]he ‗task of classifying persons
for . . . benefits . . . inevitably requires that some persons who have
almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different
sides of the line,‘ and the fact the line might have been drawn
differently at some points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial,
92
consideration.‖

B. Fifth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process
The preceding cases dealt with the Fourteenth Amendment‘s
application to state tax laws. By its terms, the clause restrains only state
governments. However, the Fifth Amendment‘s due process guarantee,
beginning with Bolling v. Sharpe,93 has been interpreted as imposing the
same restrictions on the federal government. ―Congress and not the
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974).
Madden v. Commonwealth, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
Citizens‘ Tel. Co. v. Fuller, 229 U.S. 322, 329 (1913).
Martinez, supra note 86, at 437–38.
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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courts has the right to select the measure and objects of taxation and such
taxes are valid unless constitutional provisions are violated.‖94
In 1996, Congress changed the rules regarding exclusion of tort
recoveries. In upholding the change, the Court stated,
Because the statutory provision in question does not ―interfere with the
exercise of a fundamental right, such as freedom of speech, or employ a
suspect classification, such as race,‖ the distinction that it creates is
constitutional as long it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate
government purpose. The legislature has particularly broad discretion
in creating distinctions in tax statutes, and ―is not bound to tax every
member of a class or none. It may make distinctions of degree having a
rational basis, and when subjected to judicial scrutiny they must be
presumed to rest on that basis if there is any conceivable state of facts
which would support it.‖ ―The burden is on the one attacking the
legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which
95
might support it.‖

This leaves us with two conclusions. First, although an argument
may be made for inclusion of ―functionally equivalent‖ families in the
tax benefits provided to traditional families, the legislature may,
nonetheless, draw the line at families who are capable of producing
children. Such a distinction, while discriminatory, is not sufficient to
implicate equal protection concerns.96
The second is related to the first. Same-sex couples, whether with
children or without, are not similarly situated to opposite-sex couples in
the eyes of the tax law. As a result, given the unique position of tax law
with respect to judicial deference, no challenge to the classification of
traditional families as preferential would prevail.

94. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 167 (1911).
95. Young v. United States, 332 F.3d 893, 895–96 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
96. See Collins Music Co. v. United States, 21 F.3d 1330, 1337 n.12 (4th Cir. 1994) (―It is
well settled that Congress has much latitude in formulating prerequisites to deductions and that,
frequently, only some subset of a group of substantially similarly-situated taxpayers will be entitled
to a deduction because only the members of that subset fit the precise statutory requirements
delineated by Congress for the deduction.‖) (citing Wisely v. United States, 893 F.2d 660, 666 (4th
Cir. 1990) (―Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer seeking the benefit of a
deduction must show that every condition which Congress has seen fit to impose has been fully
satisfied.‖)).

356

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 22

VII. CONCLUSION
Tax law prefers traditional married couples with children. The range
of benefits runs from cradle97 to grave,98 including child tax credits,
adoption credits, dependent care credits, education credits, and spousal
transfer deductions. Some benefits that are specifically designed to help
the child are available equally to single parents or same-sex couples.
However, the full range of tax benefits—including tax-free spousal
transfers—is available only to opposite-sex married couples.
The tax law encourages individuals to marry and have children, not
because it is an essential component of the tax, but because it is an
essential part of society. Other types of couples or individuals may
choose to have children, and some may choose to raise children born to
others. Some opposite-sex married couples may not choose to have
children at all, and some may be lousy parents. However, the tax law
does not involve itself in interviewing prospective parents regarding their
plans to have children or their child-rearing skills. Instead, the tax law
implements society‘s desire to provide an incentive for that institution
which seems best suited to perpetuate society—the traditional family.
Within the traditional family, the combination of the potential for a
stable relationship, the ability to procreate, and the environment to rear
children has resulted in a package of tax benefits. Even though individual
benefits may be claimed by others due to imitation of some of the roles
filled by the traditional family, only the traditional family justifies this
tax accommodation.
A same-sex couple may not have a child without involving a third
party, which is not the same for an opposite-sex couple. The same-sex
couple also lacks a parent of one gender. An unmarried opposite-sex
couple is also different from a married couple, for while they may have
children without the involvement of a third party, there is a risk that one
party may leave the relationship without notice. Risks do exist in every
parenting relationship, but the tax law does not require mathematical
precision to extend benefits. In guessing which types of couples will
most likely produce the desired continuation of society, Congress need
only act rationally.
Courts and legislatures looking at other areas of the law have
concluded that disallowing same-sex couples to be married is
discriminatory. However, changing the definition of marriage is a
sweeping change and implicates a host of issues, not the least of which

97. E.g., I.R.C. § 24 (Lexis 2008); I.R.C. § 23 (Lexis 2008).
98. E.g., I.R.C. § 2056 (Lexis 2008).
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involves federal tax benefits. Despite what may happen in other areas of
the law, the justification to change the tax law is not present. Same-sex
couples may qualify for some child benefits that are available to single
parents, but the full range of incentives are not now, nor are they likely to
be in the future, available to same-sex couples.

